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ON FORWARD INDUCTION
SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
Abstract. We examine Hillas and Kohlberg's conjecture that invariance to the addition
of payo®-redundant strategies implies that a backward induction outcome survives deletion
of strategies that are inferior replies to all equilibria with the same outcome. Although it
su±ces in simple games to interpret backward induction as a subgame-perfect or sequential
equilibrium, to obtain general theorems we use a quasi-perfect equilibrium, i.e. a sequential
equilibrium in strategies that are admissible continuations from each information set. Using
this version of backward induction, we prove the Hillas-Kohlberg conjecture for two-player
extensive-form games with perfect recall. We also prove an analogous theorem for general
games by using the property of a proper equilibrium that it is equivalent to a quasi-perfect
equilibrium of every extensive form with the same normal form, provided beliefs are justi¯ed
by perturbations invariant to inessential transformations of the extensive form. For a two-
player game we prove that if a set of equilibria includes a proper equilibrium of every
game with the same reduced normal form then it satis¯es forward induction, i.e. it includes
a proper equilibrium of the game after deleting strategies that are inferior replies to all
equilibria in the set. We invoke slightly stronger versions of invariance and properness to
handle nonlinearities in an N-player game.
1. Introduction
Our purpose is to address suggestions by Hillas [14] and Kohlberg [17] and the following
summary observation by Hillas and Kohlberg [16] in their survey of equilibrium re¯nements:
\... there appears to be a relationship between backward and forward induc-
tion. In many examples|in fact, in all of the examples we have examined|a
combination of the invariances we have discussed and backward induction
gives the results of forward induction arguments ... ." [16, x13.6]
Their examples and others in the literature are two-player games in extensive form with
perfect recall that are typically either outside-option games or signaling games. The usual
assumptions are that:
² Backward induction means that the outcome results from a subgame-perfect or se-
quential equilibrium.
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² Invariance means survival of the backward induction outcome when payo®-redundant
strategies are adjoined to the game.
² Forward induction means survival of the backward induction outcome after deletion
of strategies that are inferior replies to all equilibria with that outcome.
In x2 we review the motivation for forward induction and reprise two standard examples
using these same assumptions.
However, a sequential equilibrium is an insu±cient representation of backward induction
in games more complicated than the usual motivating examples. Here we obtain general
theorems by using a quasi-perfect equilibrium. One can interpret van Damme's [6] de¯nition
of quasi-perfect equilibrium as the re¯nement of sequential equilibrium that requires each
player's strategy to provide an admissible continuation from each information set. Using
this version of backward induction, Theorem 3.5 veri¯es the Hillas-Kohlberg conjecture for
two-player games in extensive form with perfect recall.
In x4 and x5 we develop formulations of backward and forward induction adapted to general
games, including games in normal form. In x6 and x7 we prove analogs of the Hillas-Kohlberg
conjecture for general two-player and N-player games.
The paper is divided into two parts that are largely independent and can be read separately.
In x2 and x3 we focus on games in extensive form, and in x4 { x7 on games in normal form. A
more stringent version of forward induction proposed by van Damme [8] is addressed brie°y
in x8.
2. Forward Induction in Extensive-Form Games
In this section we review in x2.1 and x2.2 the motivation for forward induction in extensive-
form games. The main ideas are illustrated in x2.3 by two examples, one an outside-option
game and the other a signaling game.
2.1. Background. Kohlberg and Mertens [18] introduce forward induction as a criterion for
selecting among the Nash equilibria of a game. They do not provide an explicit de¯nition,
relying instead on motivating examples and the cryptic label to their theorem that:
\(Forward Induction) A stable set contains a stable set of any game obtained
by deletion of a strategy which is an inferior response in all the equilibria of
the set." [18, Proposition 6]ON FORWARD INDUCTION 3
This property|that a subset of a selected set of equilibria survives deletion of inferior
strategies|is seen by subsequent authors as the crucial test for forward induction. How-
ever, the relevance of this test is not immediately obvious from the motivation for forward
induction. The motivation is summarized by Hillas and Kohlberg [16]:
\... a self-enforcing assessment of the game must not only be consistent with
deductions based on the opponents' rational behavior in the future (back-
ward induction) but it must also be consistent with deductions based on the
opponents' rational behavior in the past (forward induction)." [16, x42.11]
\Forward induction involves an assumption that players assume, even if
they see something unexpected, that the other players chose rationally in the
past." [16, x42.13.6]
In the next subsection we explain the motivation for forward induction in more detail and
show how one is led to test for forward induction by considering the e®ects of deleting inferior
strategies.
2.2. Motivation for Forward Induction in a Generic Extensive-Form Game. The
literature includes no formal de¯nition of forward induction; e.g. Hillas and Kohlberg [16,
x42.11] say that, \A formal de¯nition of forward induction has proved a little elusive."
Here we review the basic ideas in the context of a game in extensive form with perfect
recall and generic payo®s, which includes the motivating examples in the literature. For
such a game, all Nash equilibria in a connected set induce the same outcome, viz. the same
probability distribution on terminal nodes of the game tree [10]. For simplicity in this
subsection and the next, we assume that backward induction is satis¯ed by a sequential
equilibrium of the extensive form, and by an outcome we shall mean an outcome resulting
from some sequential equilibrium. That is, within the components of Nash equilibria with
that outcome, some equilibria are sequential.1
Recall that a sequential equilibrium requires that, from each of his information sets, a
player's strategy is an optimal continuation in reply to other players' strategies. Optimality
is based on some consistent beliefs; i.e. for each information set, on conditional probabilities
of the histories that reach it, even for those information sets not reached with positive
probability by the equilibrium strategies. The sequential equilibria with the same outcome
di®er only in their beliefs and behaviors at information sets not reached by equilibrium play.
1It is often the case that some non-sequential equilibria in such a component become sequential if su±cient
payo®-redundant strategies are adjoined to the extensive form|see the example in [12, x2.3]. However, to
address the Hillas-Kohlberg conjecture without confusing the issue it is preferable not to invoke invariance
to payo®-redundant strategies in the motivation or de¯nition of forward induction. For the same reason we
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The motive for forward induction is to enforce some discipline on beliefs and hence behav-
iors at unreached information sets, and thereby to select among the equilibrium outcomes.
The examples in the literature suggest two ways.
(1) Along the boundary of the set of equilibria inducing a given outcome there is often
some player who is indi®erent between his equilibrium strategy and a particular
deviation. That is, for some equilibrium in the set the deviation is an optimal reply.
One can therefore require that, at another player's information set that might have
been reached due to this deviation, his belief should assign a greater likelihood to this
deviation than to errors with no rational explanation|and therefore his continuation
strategy should be an optimal reply to this belief. Note that this approach stems from
consideration of sets of equilibria, a perspective that Kohlberg and Mertens [18] and
Hillas and Kohlberg [16] emphasize is intrinsic to forward induction. See Example 1
in x2.3 for an illustration.
(2) A more pragmatic perspective argues that other players' beliefs should allow inter-
pretation of a player's actions as credible signals of private information or future
intentions. That is, a player attempting to signal should not be stymied by others'
beliefs that are blind to the implications of observed actions. For instance, Kohlberg
and Mertens [18, p. 1013] assert that, \a subgame should not be treated as a separate
game, because it was preceded by a very speci¯c form of preplay communication|the
play leading to the subgame." Based on the motivating examples of sender-receiver
signaling games, the typical source of an intransigent belief at an information set o®
the path of equilibrium play is the receiver's insistence on ascribing positive condi-
tional probability to strategies of the sender that are dominated or otherwise inferior
when other strategies are more likely sources of deviant behavior by the sender. Again
the suggested discipline is to require beliefs to recognize the possible rational expla-
nations for deviations. A typical application of this approach to signaling games is
Cho and Kreps' [4] `equilibrium dominance' and `intuitive' criteria, which restrict the
support of the receiver's belief to those types of the signaler who might bene¯t from
deviating if they anticipate the receiver's optimal reply to this belief. See Example 2
in x2.3 for an illustration.
Both (1) and (2) suggest a minimal test, the one used by Kohlberg and Mertens and again
by Hillas and Kohlberg in their analyses of examples. If some equilibrium with the given
outcome is sensitive to the presence of a deviant action, in the sense that its incentive
compatibility constraint is binding, then possibly there is a rational explanation for the
deviation. Conversely, if no rational explanation is possible then presumably this constraint isON FORWARD INDUCTION 5
nowhere binding. Therefore, the same outcome should survive when that action is excluded.
By `excluded' one can mean restricting the action's probability to be zero in the belief of any
other player or equivalently, as we do here, deleting the pure strategies that use that action.
One can interpret this test as implementing the following de¯nition of forward induction
in the context of this section.
De¯nition 2.1 (Test for Forward Induction). An outcome satis¯es the test for forward
induction if it remains an equilibrium outcome after deleting actions that are inferior replies
to every equilibrium with that outcome.
Here, an action at an information set is an inferior reply if every strategy that does not ex-
clude the information set and that chooses the action is an inferior reply in every equilibrium
having the speci¯ed outcome; and deleting an action entails deleting all paths that follow it
in the game tree.
If an outcome of a sequential equilibrium passes this test for forward induction then it can
be supported with beliefs that assign zero probability to inferior replies to all equilibria with
that outcome, and conversely. This test is consistent in major respects with the applications
of forward induction to outside-option games by van Damme [7] and Hauk and Hurkens [13];
weaker variants of forward induction to signaling games by Banks and Sobel [1], Cho and
Kreps [4], and Cho and Sobel [5]; and others reviewed in surveys by Fudenberg and Tirole [9,
x11], Hillas and Kohlberg [16], and Kreps and Sobel [19].
2.3. Examples. In this subsection we use two standard examples to illustrate how the test
for forward induction can reject some equilibria. We also use these examples to illustrate
that one obtains the same result when backward induction is complemented by invariance
to the addition of payo®-redundant strategies, which anticipates Theorem 3.5 below.
Example 1 | An Outside-Option Game. The top panel of Figure 1 displays the
extensive and normal forms of a two-player game consisting of a subgame with simultaneous
moves that is preceded by an outside option initially available to player I. As in case (1) the
component of equilibria in which player I chooses his outside option includes an equilibrium
in which player II's strategy has probability 2/3 of his left column and therefore player
I is indi®erent about deviating to his top row in the subgame, whereas there is no such
equilibrium justifying deviating to the bottom row. Or as in case (2) player I might anticipate
that player II will recognize rejection of the outside option as a signal that player I will
choose the top row and therefore II should respond with the left column. To apply the test
for forward induction one deletes the inferior strategy in which I's rejection of the outside



















Figure 1. Two versions of a game with an outside option
fails the test, since in the pruned subgame player II's dominant strategy is to play left, and
anticipating this, player I rejects the outside option.
As in Hillas [14, Figure 2], one can invoke invariance and backward induction to obtain
this conclusion. The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the extensive form after adjoining a re-
dundant strategy in which, after tentatively rejecting the outside option, player I randomizes
between the outside option and the top row of the subgame with probabilities 3/4 and 1/4.
Player II does not observe which strategy of player I led to rejection of the outside option.
In the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of this equivalent game player I rejects both the
outside option and the randomization and then chooses the top row of the ¯nal subgame.
Example 2 | A Signaling Game. The top panel of Figure 2 displays the two-
player game Beer-Quiche studied by Cho and Kreps [4] and discussed further by Kohlberg
and Mertens [18, x3.6.B] and Fudenberg and Tirole [9, x11.2]. Consider the component of
sequential equilibria with the outcome Q-R; that is, both types W and S of player I choose
Q and player II responds with R. The equilibria in this component are sustained by player
II's belief after observing B that I's type W was as likely to have deviated as type S. In all
these equilibria, B is an inferior choice for type W. But in the equilibrium for which player
II assigns equal probabilities to W and S after observing B and mixes equally between F and
R, type S is indi®erent between Q and B, as in case (1) above, and if II recognizes this as
the source of I's deviation then he will infer after observing B that I's type is S and therefore
choose R. Alternatively, as in case (2), if player I's type is S then he might deviate to B in
hopes that this action will credibly signal his type, since his equilibrium payo® is 2 from Q








































Figure 2. Two versions of the Beer-Quiche game
B: F F R R
W S Q: F R F R
B B 9,1 9,1 29,9 29,9
B Q 0,1 18,10 2,0 20,9
Q B 10,1 12,0 28,10 30,9
Q Q 1,1 21,9 1,1 21,9
Q X 2,1 20,8 4,2 22,9
Table 1. Normal form of the Beer-Quiche game with the redundant strategy QX
no comparable incentive to deviate. One can therefore apply the test for forward induction
by considering the `pruned' game obtained by deleting player I's action B when his type is
W, or in the normal form by deleting player I's pure strategies that choose B when his type
is W. In fact, the sequential equilibria that choose Q do not survive in the pruned game,
since player II's optimal response to B is then R, which makes it advantageous for player
I's type S to deviate by choosing B. Thus the sequential equilibria with the outcome Q-R
do not satisfy the test for forward induction. This leaves only the component of sequential
equilibria with the outcome B-R in which both types of player I choose B.8 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
As in Example 1, one can obtain this same conclusion by invoking invariance and back-
ward induction. The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the extensive form after adjoining a
redundant action X for type S of player I that produces a randomization between B and
Q with probabilities 1/9 and 8/9. Note that X is an optimal action for I's type S at some
equilibria in the component. Denote by BQ player I's pure strategy that chooses B if his type
is W and chooses Q if his type is S, and similarly for his other pure strategies. The normal
form of this expanded game is shown in Table 1 with all payo®s multiplied by 10. Now con-
sider the following extensive form that has the same normal form. Player I initially chooses
whether or not to use his pure strategy QQ, and if not then subsequently he chooses among
his other pure strategies BB, BQ, QB, and QX. After each of these ¯ve pure strategies, the
extensive form in the bottom panel ensues, but with I's action dictated by his prior choice of
a strategy. That is, nature chooses I's type to be W or S, the selected pure strategy dictates
the subsequent choice of B or Q, and then player II (still having observed only which one of
B or Q was chosen) chooses F or R. At player I's information set where, after rejecting QQ,
he chooses among his other pure strategies, a sequential equilibrium requires that he assigns
zero probability to BQ, since it is strictly dominated by QX in the continuation. At player
II's information set after observing B, a sequential equilibrium requires that his behavioral
strategy is an optimal reply to some consistent belief about those strategies and types of
player I that reach this information set. But every mixture of I's pure strategies BB, QB, and
QX implies that, given his choice of B, the conditional probability that his type is S exceeds
9/10. Therefore, player II's reply to B must be R in every sequential equilibrium of this
extensive form. Hence the component with outcome Q-R is inconsistent with invariance and
backward induction, in agreement with its failure to satisfy the test for forward induction.
In Examples 1 and 2 it is su±cient to interpret backward induction as requiring a se-
quential equilibrium. However, more complicated examples show that this interpretation is
insu±cient in general extensive-form games, such as those in which the players alternative
moves repeatedly along a single path of play.
For the remainder of the paper we interpret backward induction as requiring a quasi-
perfect equilibrium. By enforcing admissibility of continuation strategies at each information
set, a quasi-perfect equilibrium enforces a more stringent version of rationality than does a
sequential equilibrium. Most relevant for forward induction, however, is that quasi-perfection
ensures that the beliefs that support a sequential equilibrium \respect preferences" as de¯ned
by Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel [2], as we elaborate in x4.2.ON FORWARD INDUCTION 9
3. A Version of the Hillas-Kohlberg Conjecture for Two-Player Games
In this section we prove a version of the Hillas-Kohlberg conjecture for any two-player game
in extensive form with perfect recall. In this context, by an outcome we mean a probability
distribution on the terminal nodes of the game tree induced by the players' strategies in
some equilibrium. Because the game has perfect recall, Kuhn's theorem implies that the
possible outcomes from mixed and behavioral strategies are the same.
3.1. Quasi-Perfection. As mentioned, by a backward induction outcome we mean one
induced by a quasi-perfect equilibrium. Van Damme [6] de¯nes a quasi-perfect equilibrium
as a sequential equilibrium that satis¯es a weak version of conditional admissibility of a
player's continuation strategy from each information set; viz., at each of his information sets
a player's action must initiate a continuation strategy that is optimal against a shrinking
sequence of perturbations of other players' strategies.
De¯nition 3.1 (Quasi-Perfect). A quasi-perfect equilibrium is a limit point of a sequence of
"-quasi-perfect pro¯les as " # 0, where a pro¯le b" of completely mixed behavioral strategies
is "-quasi-perfect if at each information set of a player n the probability of choosing an action
exceeds " only if there is an optimal continuation strategy in reply to (b"
m)m6=n that chooses
that action.
3.2. Formulation. Next we establish the formulation used for Theorem 3.5 below.
For the remainder of this section, let ¡ be a two-player game in extensive form with
perfect recall. Our notation for a generic player is n and we use m for his opponent. For
each player n let Sn, §n, and Bn be his sets of pure, mixed, and behavioral strategies,
respectively, and let S, §, and B be the corresponding product sets of pro¯les of players'
strategies. If a strategy for player n excludes one of his information sets, his choice at that
information set is irrelevant. Therefore, the normal form of ¡ we adopt in this section is the
simpli¯ed normal form obtained from the full normal form by treating two pure strategies
of a player as equivalent if they exclude the same information sets and prescribe the same
choices at information sets they do not exclude. For each n, each pure strategy in Sn is thus
an equivalence class of his pure strategies.2
Since we do not exclude the possibility that the payo®s in ¡ are non-generic, in De¯ni-
tion 3.2 below we use a de¯nition of forward induction that applies to sets of equilibrium
2The simpli¯ed normal form need not be the same as the reduced normal form in which one also deletes
payo®-redundant pure strategies when the payo®s are nongeneric. We use the simpli¯ed normal form only
to simplify exposition in this section. Our results remain valid if one uses the full normal form of ¡.10 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
outcomes|not just one outcome.3 Therefore, let P be a closed set of Nash equilibrium
outcomes and let B(P) and §(P) be the sets of equilibria in behavioral and mixed strategies
that induce outcomes in P.
Let Un be the collection of player n's information sets. For each information set un 2 Un
let An(un) be the set of n's available actions at un. An action an 2 An(un) is P-inferior (or
just inferior) if every pure strategy of player n that does not exclude un and that chooses an
is not an optimal reply to any equilibrium with an outcome in P. Clearly, each outcome in
P assigns zero probability to each terminal node that follows an inferior action. Let A0
n(un)
be the set of n's inferior actions at un and use A1
n(un) ´ An(un)nA0
n(un) to denote n's non-
inferior actions at un. For i = 0;1 let Ui
n be the collection of information sets un for which
Ai
n(un) 6= ; and let Ai
n = [un2Ui
nAi
n(un), assuming all actions are labeled di®erently. (To
simplify notation we omit mention of the dependence of these sets on P.)
If un 2 U0
n n U1
n (i.e. all actions at un are inferior) then necessarily un has a predecessor
and the action a0
n at its nearest predecessor u0
n that leads to un is also inferior, so continuing
backward in the game tree one ¯nds the unique last predecessor of un in U0
n \ U1
n.
Say that a pure strategy of player n is inferior if it chooses an inferior action at some
information set that it does not exclude. Let S0
n be the set of n's inferior pure strategies.
By the previous paragraph, each sn 2 S0
n chooses an inferior action at some un 2 U0
n \ U1
n
that it does not exclude. Use S1
n = Sn nS±
n to denote n's non-inferior strategies. No strategy
in S0
n is an optimal reply to any equilibrium in §(P), and the support of an equilibrium in
§(P) is contained in S1
1 £ S1
2.
3.3. De¯nition of Forward Induction in Extensive-Form Games. The pruned game
¡(P) is obtained from ¡ by deleting every path that includes a P-inferior action, i.e. an
action in A0
1 [A0
2. Observe that ¡(P) is well-de¯ned, i.e. deleting paths that include inferior
actions yields a game tree. Indeed, as above, each information set un 2 U0
n where an inferior
action is available is either in U1
n or has a unique last predecessor in U0
n\U1
n. Therefore ¡(P)
is obtained by deleting the inferior continuations from each un 2 U0
n \ U1
n. In particular,
the nodes of ¡(P) are the nodes of ¡ that are preceded only by non-inferior actions of both
players. Let Un(P) be the subcollection of n's information sets in ¡ that contain at least one
of these nodes. Then Un(P) is a subset of U1
n and it corresponds one-to-one to his collection
of information sets in ¡(P), so we use the same notation for both games.
3If ¡ has generic payo®s then all equilibria in any connected set of the Nash equilibria have the same
outcome [10, 18, 20]. In this case it su±ces to consider the singleton set of the unique outcome from a
component of the Nash equilibria.ON FORWARD INDUCTION 11
Since an outcome in P assigns probability zero to terminal nodes that follow inferior
actions, its projection to the terminal nodes of the pruned game ¡(P) is well de¯ned. Use
proj(P) to denote the set of projections of outcomes in P to the terminal nodes of ¡(P).
One sees easily that proj(P) is a set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of ¡(P).
The following de¯nition modi¯es De¯nition 2.1 to allow P to be a set of outcomes.
De¯nition 3.2 (Extensive-Form Forward Induction). The set P of outcomes of ¡ satis¯es
forward induction if proj(P) includes a backward induction outcome of the pruned game
¡(P).
Later we use the following su±cient condition for forward induction.
Lemma 3.3. The set P of outcomes of ¡ satis¯es forward induction if there exists a sequence
b" of behavioral strategy pro¯les converging to an equilibrium b 2 B(P) and a sequence of
equivalent mixed strategies ¾" such that
(1) For each n and un 2 Un(P), b prescribes an optimal action against the sequence b".
(2) Each strategy sn 2 S1
n is in the support of ¾"
n for all " and lim"#0 ¾"
n;s0
n=¾"




Proof. By Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel [2, Proposition 2] we can replace ¾" with a
convergent subsequence to construct a lexicographic probability system [LPS] (¾0
n;:::;¾Kn
n )
for each player n and a corresponding sequence (¸1
n(");:::;¸Kn
n (")) 2 (0;1)Kn converging
to the origin as " # 0 such that the sequence ¾"








n ). Obviously ¾0
n is the limit of ¾"
n and it
is equivalent to bn. Let k¤
n be the smallest integer k > ¡1 such that ¾k+1
n has some strategy
in S0
n in its support. Since ¾0
n is equivalent to bn and b belongs to B(P), k¤
n > ¡1. Also, by
Assumption (2) of the lemma, every pure strategy in S1
n is assigned a positive probability by
some i 6 k¤
n. Thus the union of the supports of ¾i
n, 0 6 i 6 k¤
n, is S1
n.
For each n, let ¹ ¾"




n where d(") is the normalizing factor.
Let ¹ b"
n be an equivalent sequence of behavioral strategies converging to some ¹ bn. As we saw
above, the support of ¹ ¾"
n is S1
n all along the sequence; therefore, at each information set in
U1
n (and hence also in Un(P)) ¹ b"
n mixes completely over the actions in A1
n(un). Moreover, we
claim that ¹ bn and bn agree at each un 2 Un(P). Indeed, for each un 2 Un(P) the set S1
n(un)
of pure strategies in sn 2 S1
n that choose all the actions preceding un is nonempty; therefore
the smallest integer 0 6 i 6 Kn such that ¾i
n contains a strategy in S1
n(un) in its support
is no more than k¤
n. The mixture prescribed both ¹ bn and bn coincide with that prescribed a
behavioral strategy equivalent to ¾i
n, which proves our claim.12 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
All along the sequence, ¹ b"
n mixes completely over actions in A1
n(un) for each un 2 Un(P),
and hence it induces a sequence ^ b"
n of completely mixed behavioral strategies in ¡(P) whose
limit ^ bn is induced ¹ bn (or equivalently bn). By passing to a subsequence we will assume that
for each n and each un 2 Un(P), the set of optimal actions against ^ b"
n is constant across the
sequence. To ¯nish the proof it is su±cient to show that at each un 2 Un(P) the mixture
prescribed by ^ bn is optimal against the sequence ^ b"
m. Suppose an is an optimal action at
an information set un 2 Un(P) against the sequence ^ b"
m and suppose a0
n is another action
there that is not. There exists 0 6 i 6 k¤
m such that: ¾i
m does not exclude un and an is a
better action than a0
n against it and for each i0 < i, either ¾i0
m excludes un or both actions
are optimal continuations against it. Given this property, and given the nestedness property
of ¾"
m, which is equivalent to b"
m, an is a better action against b"
m for all small " than a0
n. By
Assumption (1) of the lemma, a0
n is therefore assigned zero probability by bn. Hence in ^ bn it
is assigned zero probability as well. Thus ^ bn is optimal against the sequence ^ b"
m. ¤
Remark 3.4. Looking at the beliefs induced by the sequence b", one sees that for each n
and each information set un 2 Un(P) the limit of the beliefs assigns zero probability to nodes
that follow inferior actions. Thus, the lemma shows the relation between deleting inferior
strategies and directly restricting beliefs in the original game, as discussed in the motivation
for the earlier De¯nition 2.1 of the test for forward induction in x2.
To invoke invariance in Theorem 3.5 below, we de¯ne two extensive-form games that are
equivalent to ¡ in that they have the same reduced normal forms. The ¯rst is called the
splintered version of ¡, and the second, called a test game, adjoins payo®-redundant strategies
to the normal form. These are de¯ned in the next two subsections.
3.4. The Splintered Version. De¯ne the splintered version ~ ¡ to be the same as ¡ except
that each player n chooses an action at each information set un 2 U0
n \ U1
n by ¯rst choosing
whether or not to play an inferior action and then choosing an action from the chosen subset
A0
n(un) or A1
n(un). Speci¯cally, such a un is separated into three information sets ~ un, u0
n, and
u1
n such that at ~ un he decides between two actions ®0(~ un) and ®1(~ un) and then: (0) choosing
®0(~ un) leads to u0
n where only actions in A0
n(un) are available, or (1) choosing ®1(~ un) leads
to u1
n where only actions in A1
n(un) are available. Let ~ Sn, ~ Bn, and ~ §n be the sets of pure,
behavioral and mixed strategies for player n in the splintered version ~ ¡.
As with ¡, we use the simpli¯ed normal form of ~ ¡, i.e. a pure strategy is an equivalence
class of strategies that agree both on the information sets they exclude and on the actions
at those they do not. Under this assumption, the two extensive-form games ~ ¡ and ¡ haveON FORWARD INDUCTION 13
the same normal form. In order to make clear to which game we are referring, we use ~ Sn to
denote the set of pure strategies in ~ ¡. Let ~ S0
n be n's set of pure strategies in ~ Sn that choose
the action ®0(~ un) at some non-excluded ~ un. And let ~ S1
n = ~ Snn~ S0
n. Then for i = 0;1, ~ Si
n
corresponds to the set Si
n in ¡.
3.5. Test Games. The gist of the Hillas-Kohlberg conjecture is that backward induction
outcomes that survive addition of redundant strategies (i.e. satisfy invariance) must also
survive deletion of inferior strategies. Theorem 3.5 below establishes that testing whether
the outcomes in P satisfy forward induction (i.e. some outcome in proj(P) is a backward
induction outcome of the pruned game) is equivalent to checking whether some outcome in
P survives as a backward induction outcome of each game in a sequence of canonical test
games parameterized by ± 2 (0;1) as ± # 0. Each test game adjoins payo®-redundant pure
strategies, so its normal form is larger, in contrast to the pruned game whose normal form
is smaller.
Each test game ~ ¡(P;±) treats some mixed strategies of ¡ as additional pure strategies
in the resulting normal form. These payo®-redundant strategies are constructed as follows.
For each function ¼n : U1
n ! A1
n such that ¼n(un) 2 A1
n(un), and 0 < ± < 1, let bn(¼n;±)
be a behavioral strategy in ¡ that at each un 2 U1
n chooses ¼n(un) with probability 1 ¡ ±
and with probability ± mixes uniformly over the actions in A1
n(un). Let ¾n(¼n;±) be an
equivalent mixed strategy. By construction, the support of ¾n(¼n;±) is S1
n. Let Tn(P;±) be
the collection of these mixed strategies obtained from all possible functions ¼n. Similarly, in
the splintered version ~ ¡, for each ¾n(¼n;±) 2 Tn(P;±) let ~ ¾n(¼n;±) be the equivalent mixed
strategy and let ~ Tn(P;±) be the collection of these mixed strategies.
The following two facts about the strategies in Tn(P;±) (and analogously in ~ Tn(P;±))
are important to our construction. First, for every mixed strategy ¾n(¼n;±) 2 Tn(P;±) the
probability of each pure strategy sn 2 S1
n is at least c±jU1
nj, where c is a positive constant
that is independent of ¼n and ±. Second, there exists ± > 0 such that if a pure strategy sn
is an optimal reply to an equilibrium with an outcome in P then for each ±0 < ± there exists
a strategy in Tn(P;±0) that is a better reply against that equilibrium than each strategy in
S0
n; viz., this strategy puts greater weight on the optimal actions prescribed by sn at those
un 2 U1
n.
A test game ~ ¡(P;±) is an extensive-form game played in two stages, constructed as follows.
Stage 1: The ¯rst stage consists of simultaneous moves by the two players in which each
player n chooses a strategy in ~ S1
n [ ~ S0
n [ ~ Tn(P;±) using a two-step procedure. Player n
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stage for him. If he chooses yn then subsequently (at a second information set) he chooses
a strategy from the set ~ S0
n [ ~ Tn(P;±) to complete the ¯rst stage.
Thus for player n the ¯rst stage ends with a choice of either xn or (yn; ~ sn) for some ~ sn 2
~ S0
n [ ~ Tn(P;±). Player m does not learn which strategy n implemented in the ¯rst stage; viz.,
his information sets in the second stage reveal exactly the same information as in the original
game ¡ and its splintered version ~ ¡.
Stage 2: In the second stage, after each pair of choices by the two players in the ¯rst
stage, there follows a modi¯ed copy of the splintered game ~ ¡. The modi¯cations are as
follows. In each copy of ~ ¡ that follows the choice xn in the ¯rst stage, nature automatically
chooses ®1(~ un) for each un 2 U0
n \ U1
n, leaving player n to make a choice at each of his
other information sets. In each copy that follows a choice (yn; ~ sn) by player n in the ¯rst
stage, all his choices are implemented automatically by nature using the strategy ~ sn.
In the test game ~ ¡(P;±) the set of n's pure strategies that choose xn at the ¯rst stage
correspond exactly to the set ~ S1
n in the splintered version. Thus, his pure strategy set is
~ Sn(P;±) ´ ~ S1
n [ ~ S0
n [ ~ Tn(P;±). Since ~ Tn(P;±) consists of mixed strategies available in ~ ¡,
~ ¡(P;±) has the same reduced normal form as the splintered version ~ ¡ and hence ¡ itself.
Letting ~ §n(P;±) be n's mixed strategies in the test game there is a well-de¯ned linear map
~ f±
n : ~ §n(P;±) ! § that sends each mixed strategy in ~ ¡(P;±) to the implied mixture over
strategies in Sn. De¯ne ~ P(±) as the outcomes of ~ ¡(P;±) resulting from the equilibria in
( ~ f±)¡1(§(P)).
3.6. Proof of the Conjecture. The following theorem veri¯es our version of the Hillas-
Kohlberg conjecture that invariance and backward induction imply forward induction. Recall
that we implement backward induction by a quasi-perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 3.5. P satis¯es forward induction if, for each small ± > 0, ~ P(±) contains a
backward induction outcome of the canonical test game ~ ¡(P;±) that has the same reduced
normal form as ¡.
Proof. For each small ± > 0 let ~ b(±;") be a sequence of "-quasi-perfect pro¯les converg-
ing as " # 0 to a quasi-perfect equilibrium ~ b(±) of the test game ~ ¡(P;±) that induces an
outcome in ~ P(±). Let ~ ¾(±;") be a (sub)sequence of equivalent mixed strategies in ~ ¡(P;±)




n(±;")], where pxn(±;") and pyn(±;") are the probabili-
ties of the two actions xn;yn at player n's ¯rst information set in ~ ¡(P;±) under ~ b(±;"); and theON FORWARD INDUCTION 15
supports of ~ ¿1
n(±;"), ~ ¿0
n(±;"), and ~ ¿2
n(±;") are contained in ~ S1
n, ~ S0
n, and ~ Tn(P;±) respectively,
which determines rn(±;").




n(±;")) and let ¾n(±;") = ~ f±
n(~ ¾(±;")). By the linearity of ~ f±





n(±) be the limit of ¿i
n(±;") as " # 0. Let
b(±;") be a sequence of behavioral pro¯les equivalent to ¾(±;") and let b(±) be its limit as
" # 0.
If ± is small enough then some strategy in Tn(P;±) is a better reply against bm(±) than
each strategy in S0
n; therefore, the corresponding strategy in ~ Tn(P;±) is a better reply against
~ bm(±). Optimal continuation from player n's information set following the choice of yn
therefore requires that, for all small ±, rn(±;") converges to zero as " # 0.
By the sequential rationality of player n's decision following his choice of xn in the ¯rst
stage of the test games, ~ ¿1
n(±) is at least as good a reply as any strategy in ~ S1
n against the
sequence ~ ¾m(±;"). In ¡, therefore, for each un 2 Un(P), if un is not excluded by strategies in
a sequence ¿1
n(±;") then the behavioral randomization implied by ¿1
n(±) is optimal against the
sequence bm(±;"). By the sequential rationality of playing ~ ¿2
n(±) at the node following yn the
total probability of actions that are not optimal against the sequence ~ bm(±;") under ~ ¿2
n(±) is
at most ±. In ¡, therefore, the total probability under bn(±) of actions that are suboptimal
at un 2 Un(P) against the sequence bm(±;") is no more than ±. Choose now a sequence of
±'s converging to zero such that b(±) converges to an equilibrium b 2 B(P) of ¡. For each ±
in the sequence choose "(±) such that rn(±;"(±)) 6 ±(jU1
nj+1) for n = 1;2.
We now prove that the corresponding sequence b(±;"(±)) in ¡ satis¯es the two conditions
of Lemma 3.3, which completes the proof of the theorem. Regarding condition (1), for
each n and each un 2 Un(P), if an action at un is not optimal against a subsequence of
bm(±;"(±)) then as we saw above its probability under bn(±) is at most ± and hence its
probability is zero in bn. Regarding condition (2), ~ ¿2
n(±;"(±)) is a mixture over strategies in
~ Tn(P;±), each of which (as a mixed strategy in ¡) has support S1
n and assigns probability
at least c±jU1
nj to each strategy in S1
n. Therefore the probability of each strategy in ~ S1
n
is at least pyn(±;"(±))[1 ¡ rn(±;"(±))]c±jU1
nj. The probability of strategies in ~ S0
n is at most
pyn(±;"(±))c±jU1
n+1j. Hence the limit of the ratios of these probabilities is zero. In ¡, therefore,
the corresponding limit of the ratios of probabilities of strategies in S1
n and S0
n is also zero,
which is condition (2) of Lemma 3.3. ¤
In the following sections we extend the above result to general games, ¯rst for two players
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4. Forward Induction in General Games
In this section we ¯rst provide in x4.1 an overview of the assumptions and results obtained
in the remainder of the paper, and then in x4.2 we justify the formulation of backward
induction in terms of a proper equilibrium that we use for a game in normal form.
4.1. Summary of Assumptions and Results. We assume equivalence of the extensive
and normal forms of a game, and we invoke invariance with respect to payo®-redundant
strategies in the normal form. Thus we consider all games in normal or extensive form (with
perfect recall) having the same reduced normal form to be strategically equivalent.
We interpret backward induction as requiring a quasi-perfect equilibrium in every exten-
sive form with the same normal form. Backward induction is also required to be consistent
with invariance in the following sense. The quasi-perfect equilibria in extensive forms that
di®er only by inessential transformations (i.e., have the same normal form) should be sup-
ported by beliefs generated by the same perturbations; that is, by the same perturbations
of strategies in the normal form. To represent this version of backward induction in the nor-
mal form of a game we rely on the characterization by Hillas [15] and Mailath, Samuelson,
and Swinkels [21]. They show that a proper equilibrium of a normal form is the limit of a
sequence of "-proper pro¯les as " # 0 if and only if in every extensive form with that normal
form there is a quasi-perfect equilibrium that is the limit of this same sequence. Thus, a
proper equilibrium is precisely the right normal-form representation of backward induction
when it is required to induce a quasi-perfect equilibrium in every extensive form with that
normal form, and conversely. See x4.2 below for further discussion.
We therefore interpret forward induction as follows. A subset of the Nash equilibria of a
game satis¯es forward induction if its projection contains a proper equilibrium of the game
obtained by deleting each player's pure strategies that are inferior replies to every equilibrium
in the subset.
For a two-player game we prove in x6 that if a set of equilibria includes a proper equilibrium
for every equivalent game then this set satis¯es forward induction. In x7 we use slightly
stronger versions of invariance and properness for a game with more than two players.
4.2. Forward Induction for a Game in Normal Form. The formulation of backward
and forward induction in terms of sequential equilibria of the extensive form used in x2 is not
directly usable here. Our aim is to verify a general version of the Hillas-Kohlberg conjecture
that invariances and backward induction imply forward induction. The invariances they
(and we) invoke are the equivalence of the extensive and normal forms of a game, and the
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payo®-redundant pure strategies. Backward induction must therefore be formulated in terms
of equilibria of the normal form. We argue below that a proper equilibrium is the best
representation of backward induction in the normal form. Although the subsequent theorems
do not depend on this interpretation, we o®er it to establish a connection to the analogous
Theorem 3.5 for games in extensive form.
The ¯rst step is to recognize that a sequential equilibrium is not generally an adequate
representation of backward induction in an extensive form. As observed by Kohlberg and
Mertens [18, x2.4], a sequential equilibrium can use inadmissible strategies and it need not
survive inessential transformations of the extensive form. At a minimum, therefore, the
formulation should avoid these de¯ciencies. The apparently weakest re¯nement of sequential
equilibrium that assures admissibility is a quasi-perfect equilibrium of the extensive form, as
de¯ned by van Damme [6]. Regarding invariance to inessential transformations, our approach
is to enforce this property directly, as follows. Recall that a sequential or quasi-perfect
equilibrium speci¯es for each player a pair comprising a mixed (or behavioral) strategy and
a consistent belief that is the limit of the conditional probability system obtained from a
convergent sequence of perturbed strategies. We require similarly that a representation of
backward induction in the normal form speci¯es such pairs for every extensive form with
the same normal form. Because we assume invariance, moreover, we require that the same
sequence of perturbed strategies induces the beliefs in each equivalent extensive form.
To implement this requirement we imitate the proof in Hillas [15]. This uses the formu-
lation of equilibrium in terms of lexicographic probability systems, as de¯ned by Blume,
Brandenberger, and Dekel [2]. Considering only a two-player game for simplicity, a lexico-
graphic equilibrium is speci¯ed by a lexicographic probability system [LPS] for each player
n that is a sequence of mixed strategies, say Ln = (¾0
n;:::;¾Kn
n ) such that each of his pure
strategies is assigned a positive probability by some level of Ln. A sequential equilibrium
has a lexicographic representation using a weak version of optimality, namely, at each of his
information sets player n's equilibrium strategy ¾0
n is an optimal reply to the ¯rst level of
the other's LPS that does not exclude reaching that information set. A quasi-perfect equi-
librium requires further that his strategy is a lexicographically optimal reply to the ensuing
subsequence of the other's LPS. Now suppose one insists further that the same LPS for
each player should provide a quasi-perfect equilibrium in every extensive form with the same
normal form. Then independently of the extensive form, each LPS respects preferences [2]:
for any two pure strategies sn;s0
n of player n, if sn is a lexicographic better reply than s0
n
against his opponent's LPS then sn is in¯nitely more likely than s0
n according to Ln, i.e.
if s0
n is assigned a positive probability by ¾k
n then sn is assigned a positive probability by18 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
¾j
n for some j < k. This is precisely Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel's [2, Proposition 8]
characterization of a proper equilibrium of the normal form.
This is essentially the result obtained by Hillas [15] and Mailath, Samuelson, and Swinkels [21].
They characterize a sequence of "-proper pro¯les and the proper equilibrium that is its limit
as " # 0. The following summary version is stated by Hillas and Kohlberg [16, Theorem
7]: \An equilibrium ¾ of a normal-form game G is supported as a proper equilibrium by
a sequence of completely mixed strategies f¾kg with limit ¾ if and only if f¾kg induces a
quasi-perfect equilibrium in any extensive-form game having the normal form G." Thus, a
proper equilibrium is precisely the right representation of backward induction in the normal
form when backward induction in any extensive form with that normal form is represented
by a quasi-perfect equilibrium, and the perturbations that justify beliefs are invariant across
all these extensive forms.4
In x7 we use a strengthened version of properness for games with more than two players.
That this is necessary can seen in Example 2, the Beer-Quiche game. Of the two components
of equilibria of this game, only the one in which both types of player I choose B contains
a proper equilibrium of every equivalent game. But if this game is interpreted as a game
with three players by treating the two types of player I as distinct players then both com-
ponents have such equilibria; e.g., both components have proper equilibria (Kohlberg and
Mertens [18, x3.6.B]). When there are more than two players, therefore, properness must
be strengthened to establish an analogous version of the Hillas-Kohlberg conjecture. The
stronger version we use is designed to handle the nonlinearities that occur in N-player games,
and in particular to control the relative magnitudes of the probabilities of inferior strategies
in the sequence of "-proper pro¯les whose limit is a proper equilibrium.
The main tool in the two-player case is Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel's [2, Proposi-
tion 8] characterization of a proper equilibrium by a lexicographic probability system. The
analysis of the N-player case uses Lojasiewicz's inequality [3, Corollary 2.6.7].
5. Definitions for Games in Normal Form
We consider a ¯nite game G. The set of players is N = f1;:::;N g. For each player
n 2 N, let Sn and §n be his sets of pure and mixed strategies, respectively, and interpret
Sn as the vertices of the simplex §n. Let § =
Q
n §n.
4Van Damme [6] and Kohlberg and Mertens [18, Appendix A] prove that a proper equilibrium of the
normal form induces a sequential equilibrium in every extensive form with that normal form. But the
converse is false: Hillas and Kohlberg [16, Figure 23] provide an example of an improper equilibrium that
induces a sequential (in fact, quasi-perfect) equilibrium in each extensive-form representation with the same
normal form. This example does not contradict the results of Hillas [15] and Mailath, Samuelson, and
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Player n's expected payo® from the pro¯le ¾ 2 § is Gn(¾), and Gn(¾¡n;¿n) is his expected
payo® if everyone else plays according to ¾ and he plays ¿n 2 §n.
For each n 2 N, 0 < ± < 1, sn, and s0
n 2 Sn, let ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) denote the mixed strategy of
player n that randomizes between sn and s0
n with probabilities ± and 1 ¡ ±.
5.1. Invariance. We invoke two invariance principles that exclude some presentation e®ects.
The ¯rst, equivalence of the extensive and normal forms of a game, is implemented by casting
our formulation entirely in the normal form. The second requires invariance to addition or
deletion of redundant pure strategies. Say that:
(1) A pure strategy is payo®-redundant if its payo®s (for all players, and all pure strate-
gies of other players) are replicated by the expected payo®s from some mixture of
the player's other pure strategies.
(2) Two games are equivalent if they have the same reduced normal form (apart from
labeling of strategies) obtained by deleting payo®-redundant pure strategies, and
(3) Mixed strategies in equivalent games are equivalent if they induce the same mixed
strategy in the reduced normal form.
Speci¯cally, let the columns of the matrix An represent player n's pure strategies in game
G as mixed strategies in its reduced normal form G¤, and similarly ~ An represents his pure
strategies in an equivalent game ~ G. Then his mixed strategies ¾n, ~ ¾n, and ¾¤
n in the games G,
~ G, and G¤ are equivalent if An¾n = ~ An~ ¾n = ¾¤
n. Note that for each player n, Gn(¾) = G¤
n(¾¤)
since G di®ers from G¤ only by adjoining payo®-redundant strategies.
5.2. Proper Equilibrium. The de¯nition of a proper equilibrium is due to Myerson [23].
Given 0 < " < 1, a pro¯le ¾ 2 §, ¾ À 0, of completely mixed strategies is "-proper if for
each n 2 N and sn;tn 2 Sn,
Gn(¾¡n;sn) < Gn(¾¡n;tn) only if ¾n;sn 6 "¾n;tn :
A pro¯le ¾ 2 § is a proper equilibrium if there exists a sequence of positive "'s converging
to zero and a corresponding sequence of "-proper equilibria converging to ¾.
5.3. Deletion of Never Weak Best Replies. Let §¤ be a subset of the Nash equilibria of
G. Suppose for each n, we are given a subset S±
n of Sn such that each tn 2 S±
n is an inferior
reply against every equilibrium in §¤. That is,
(8 n 2 N;tn 2 S
±
n;¾ 2 §
¤) Gn(¾¡n;tn) < Gn(¾):
Consider now the game ^ G obtained by deleting the strategies in S±
n for each n. Since all the
equilibria in §¤ assign zero probability to the pure strategies in S±
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§¤ as a subset of the equilibria of ^ G by just dropping the coordinates corresponding to the
deleted strategies|that is, by projecting §¤ into the set ^ § of pro¯les of mixed strategies in
^ G. In De¯nition 5.1 below, and throughout, forward induction is applied in this way.
5.4. Forward Induction in Normal-Form Games. Our main results establish su±cient
conditions for the following version of forward induction.
De¯nition 5.1 (Forward Induction). A subset §¤ of the Nash equilibria satis¯es forward
induction if it includes a proper equilibrium of the game obtained by deleting each player's
pure strategies that are inferior replies to every equilibrium in §¤.
6. Two-Player Games in Normal Form
Recall that the Hillas-Kohlberg conjecture asks whether invariance and backward induc-
tion imply forward induction. The following theorem veri¯es this conjecture for our normal-
form versions of backward and forward induction.
Theorem 6.1. If a closed subset of the Nash equilibria of a two-player game includes for
every equivalent game an equilibrium equivalent to a proper equilibrium of that game then
it satis¯es forward induction.
An extensive-form version is the following. If a subset of the Nash equilibria of a two-
player game induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium for every extensive form with the same
reduced normal form, with beliefs justi¯ed by perturbations invariant across extensive forms
with the same normal form, then also for the normal-form game obtained by deleting players'
strategies that are inferior replies to every equilibrium in the subset, an equilibrium in the
subset induces a quasi-perfect equilibrium for every extensive form with that normal form,
with beliefs justi¯ed by perturbations invariant across these extensive forms.
In outline, the following proof (1) invokes the hypothesized existence of a proper equi-
librium for the equivalent game obtained by adjoining redundant pure strategies that are
mixtures of used and non-inferior strategies, (2) observes that if the used strategies have
large probabilities in these mixtures then the inferior pure strategies have positive proba-
bility only in mixed strategies in the tail of the lexicographic probability system [LPS] that
characterizes this proper equilibrium, and then (3) chops o® the tail to obtain a truncated
LPS that characterizes a proper equilibrium for the `pruned' game obtained by deleting the
inferior strategies.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Let §¤ be a closed subset of the Nash equilibria of G that satis¯es the
hypothesis of the theorem. Suppose for each player n that S±
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that are inferior replies by player n against every equilibrium in §¤. Let ^ G be the game
obtained from G by deleting the strategies in S±
n for each player n. We show that §¤
contains a proper equilibrium of ^ G.
For n = 1;2, let S¤
n be the set of pure strategies that are in the support of some equilibrium
in §¤. From G construct the equivalent game ¹ G by adjoining the following mixed strategies
as pure strategies: for each sn 2 S¤
n and each s0
n 2 Sn n S±
n, adjoin the mixed strategy
¾n(sn;s0
n;±), where 0 < ± < 1 is su±ciently large that if sn is a best reply against a strategy
pro¯le ¾¤ 2 §¤ then ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) is a better reply against ¾¤ than each tn 2 S±
n. The games
G and ¹ G are obviously equivalent.
By assumption, §¤ includes an equilibrium ¾¤ that is equivalent to a proper equilibrium
¹ ¾¤ of ¹ G. As in Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel [2, Proposition 5], there exists for each n
a lexicographical probability system [LPS] ¹ Ln = (¹ ¾0
n;:::; ¹ ¾Kn
n ) over his strategies in ¹ G such
that: (i) ¹ ¾¤
n = ¹ ¾0
n; (ii) ¹ Ln has full support in the sense that each pure strategy is assigned
a positive probability by some level of ¹ Ln; and (iii) ¹ Ln respects preferences: for any two
pure strategies ¹ sn; ¹ s0
n of player n in the game ¹ G, if ¹ sn is a lexicographic better reply than ¹ s0
n
against his opponent's LPS in ¹ G, then ¹ sn is in¯nitely more likely than ¹ s0
n according to ¹ Ln,
i.e. if ¹ s0
n is assigned a positive probability by ¹ ¾k
n for some k, then ¹ sn is assigned a positive
probability by ¹ ¾j
n for some j < k.
For each n let k¤
n be smallest integer such that for each s0
n 2 Sn n S±
n, either s0
n or one
of the new \pure" strategies ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) for some sn 2 S¤
n has a positive probability under
¹ ¾k
n for some k 6 k¤
n. We claim now that, for each k 6 k¤
n, ¹ ¾k
n assigns zero probability to
every strategy in S±
n. Indeed, choose sn in the support of ¾¤
n; then for each s0
n 2 Sn n S±
n,
the mixed strategy ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) is a better reply against ¾¤ than each tn 2 S±
n; hence, in the
game ¹ G, the pure strategy ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) is a better reply than each such tn against ¹ ¾¤, which
is equivalent to ¾¤. Since ¹ Ln respects preferences, ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) is in¯nitely more likely than
tn; therefore, by the de¯nition of k¤
n, tn is assigned zero probability by level k 6 k¤
n of ¹ Ln.
For each n and 0 6 k 6 k¤
n, let ¾k be the mixed strategy in G that is equivalent to ¹ ¾k
n and




n ). Using our claim in the previous paragraph, we see that for
each k, the support of ¾k
n is contained in Sn n S±
n. Therefore Ln can be viewed as an LPS in
the game ^ G. Moreover, by the de¯nition of k¤
n, each strategy in SnnS±
n is assigned a positive
probability by some level of Ln. Therefore, Ln has full support in ^ G. We claim now that it
respects preferences as well. Indeed, suppose sn is a better reply than s0
n against Ln, and s0
n
is assigned a positive probability by some level k of Ln. Then sn is a better reply against
¹ Ln than s0
n, and either: (a) s0
n or (b) some ¾n(s
00
n;s0
n;±) is assigned a positive probability by
level k of ¹ Ln. Since ¹ Ln respects preferences and sn is a better reply than s0
n against ¹ Ln as22 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON
well, sn is assigned a positive probability by ¹ ¾j
n for some j < k if (a) holds and ¾n(s
00
n;sn;±)
is assigned positive probability by ¹ ¾j
n for some j < k if (b) holds. Either way, sn is assigned
a positive probability by ¾j
n for some j < k. Thus Ln respects preferences.
Since Ln has full support and respects preferences the projection of ¾¤ is a proper equilib-
rium of ^ G, using the characterization by Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel [2, Proposition
8]. ¤
Observe that in the above proof, the set S0
n of strategies that were deleted for player n
could be a proper subset of the set of his strategies that are inferior replies against every
equilibrium in §¤. Thus the theorem shows that §¤ satis¯es forward induction in a slightly
stronger form. The same is true of its N-player analog in the next section.
6.1. Existence. Kohlberg and Mertens [18, Proposition 5] prove that every game has a fully
stable set of equilibria, and each fully stable set satis¯es invariance and includes a proper
equilibrium for every equivalent game. Hence the hypothesis of Theorem 6.1 is satis¯ed by
a fully stable set of equilibria. Stable sets as de¯ned by Mertens [22] and metastable sets
[11] also satisfy the hypothesis.5
7. N-Player Games in Normal Form
In this section we strengthen the formulations of invariance and backward induction to
obtain an analog of Theorem 6.1 for games with more than two players. We mentioned in
x4.2 the necessity of a strengthened version of properness. In fact, the insu±ciency of a
proper equilibrium stems from its de¯nition as the limit of a sequence of "-proper pro¯les
of mixed strategies for which no positive lower bounds are imposed on the probabilities of
pure strategies. Due to the nonlinearities that occur in an N-player game, our method of
proof requires positive lower bounds to control the relative magnitudes of the probabilities
of inferior strategies. The version used here, called `factorial properness,' su±ces because it
enforces lower bounds in the de¯nition of the analogous version, called an "!-proper pro¯le.
7.1. Factorial Properness. A strategy pro¯le is "!-proper for 0 < " < 1 if it is an equilib-
rium of the game G"! obtained restricting each player's set of mixed strategies to the polyhe-
dron whose vertices are the jSnj! permutations of the mixed strategy (1;";:::;"jSnj¡1)=d("),
where d(") = [1 ¡ "jSnj]=[1 ¡ "] normalizes the probabilities. Say that ¾ 2 § is proper! if
there exists a positive sequence of "'s converging to zero and a corresponding sequence of
5In [12] we show that invariance and a `truly perfect' version of quasi-perfection imply that a set of
equilibria is stable as de¯ned by Kohlberg and Mertens [18], and therefore satis¯es forward induction in the
original sense of Kohlberg and Mertens [18, Proposition 6].ON FORWARD INDUCTION 23
equilibria of G"! converging to ¾. This stronger version of properness was ¯rst considered by
Kohlberg and Mertens [18, Proposition 5], although they did not employ this terminology.
7.2. Strong Invariance. For ´ > 0, say that a pure strategy s0
n is an ´-duplicate of sn if,
for all s¡n, Gm(s¡n;sn) = Gm(s¡n;s0
n) for all m 6= n, and Gn(s¡n;sn) = Gn(s¡n;s0
n) + ´.
Thus, s0
n is an exact duplicate of sn from the viewpoint of n's opponents, but for player n
himself s0
n is a dominated strategy. Say that a pure strategy is a near-duplicate if it is either
payo®-redundant or is an ´-duplicate of some other pure strategy for some ´ > 0. Requiring
that a game is equivalent to the game obtained by adjoining near-duplicate strategies is a
slight strengthening of invariance as de¯ned in x5.1.
If ¹ G is a game obtained from G by adding near-duplicate strategies then there is a map ¼
from the strategy set ¹ § of ¹ G to § that sends each ¹ ¾ 2 ¹ § to the strategy pro¯le ¾ 2 § under
which for each n and sn 2 Sn, the probability of sn is the total probability under ¹ ¾ of the
subset of strategies in ¹ G that are near-duplicates of sn. Say that ¾ 2 § is equivalent to ¹ ¾ if
¾ = ¼(¹ ¾) and for each n and sn, ¹ ¾ assigns zero probability to strategies that are ´-duplicates
of sn for some ´.
7.3. An N-Player Version of the Hillas-Kohlberg Conjecture. We now prove a ver-
sion of the Hillas-Kohlberg conjecture for an N-player game, using still the formulation of
forward induction in De¯nition 5.1.
Theorem 7.1. If a closed subset of the Nash equilibria includes, for every game obtained
by adjoining near-duplicate strategies, an equilibrium equivalent to a proper! equilibrium of
that game, then it satis¯es forward induction.
Proof. Let §¤ be a closed subset of the Nash equilibria of a game G that satis¯es the hypoth-
esis. For each n, let S±
n be a subset of pure strategies that are inferior at each equilibrium in
§¤. Let ^ G be the game obtained from G by deleting the strategies in S±
n for each n, and let
^ Sn and ^ §n be n's pure and mixed strategy spaces in ^ G. We argue by contradiction that §¤
must include a proper equilibrium of ^ G.
Suppose §¤ does not include a proper equilibrium of ^ G. Then there exists a closed neigh-
borhood V of §¤ in ^ § and an ^ " > 0 such that V does not contain an ^ "-proper equilibrium of
^ G. Take a su±ciently ¯ne triangulation of ^ § such that the set U consisting of the simplices
of this triangulation that intersect §¤ are contained in V . U is then a closed semialgebraic
neighborhood of §¤ that is contained in V . Since U does not contain an ^ "-proper equilib-
rium of ^ G, for every completely mixed strategy pro¯le ¾ 2 U there exist n and sn;s0
n 2 ^ Sn
such that ¾n;s0
n > ^ "¾n;sn but s0
n is an inferior reply against ¾ compared to sn. Therefore the24 SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON










n ¡ ^ "¾n;sn)
+
is strictly positive on U n @^ §. De¯ne g : U ! R by g(¾) = minn;sn ¾n;sn. Then f¡1(0) µ
g¡1(0) and, by Lojasiewicz's inequality (Bochnak et al. [3, Corollary 2.6.7]), there exists a
positive real number c and a positive integer p such that f > cgp.
Construct a strongly equivalent game ¹ G by adding the following strategies for each player
n as pure strategies:
² For each sn 2 ^ Sn, kp¡j^ Snj copies of the ´-duplicate s´
n of sn, where k ´ maxn0(j^ S0
nj+
j^ S0
nj2) ¡ 1 and ´ is su±ciently small such that if sn is an optimal reply against an
equilibrium in §¤ then s´




n 2 ^ Sn, the strategy ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) where 0 < ± < 1 is su±ciently large that,
if sn is optimal against an equilibrium in §¤, ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) is a better reply than the
´-duplicate t´
n for each tn 2 ^ Sn.
Suppose ¹ G has a proper! equilibrium equivalent to an equilibrium in §¤. Then there exists a
sequence of "t's converging to zero and a corresponding sequence ¹ ¾t of "t!-proper equilibria
converging to a point ¹ ¾¤ that has an equivalent strategy pro¯le ¾¤ 2 §¤ in the game G. By
replacing the sequence with an appropriate subsequence, we can assume that the preference
ordering over the pure strategies in ¹ G for each n when his opponents play according to ¹ ¾t is
independent of t. For each n ¯x a pure strategy sn in the original game G that is optimal all
along the sequence ¹ ¾t. For each s0
n 2 ^ Sn now, the only strategies in ¹ G that are possibly at
least as good a reply as ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) against ¹ ¾¤ are the strategies in ^ Sn and those of the form
¾n(tn;t0
n;±) for tn;t0
n in ^ Sn|and hence this property holds all along the sequence ¹ ¾t as well.
The number of strategies that are possibly no worse replies against ¹ ¾t than ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) is
therefore j^ Snj + j^ Snj2 ¡ 1. Since ¹ ¾t is a sequence of "t!-proper equilibria, we then have that
for each s0
n 2 ^ Sn, "k
t = O(¾t
n;¾n(sn;s0




for all t. The strategies that are better replies than the ´-duplicate s´
n of sn include sn itself
and the strategies ¾n(sn;s0
n;±) for s0





t ) for each copy of the
the ´-duplicate s´
n. s´
n is a better reply than each s±
n 2 S±
n against ¹ ¾¤ and, hence, against the
sequence ¹ ¾t. Since there are kp¡j^ Snj copies of s´








For each element of the sequence ¹ ¾t and each player n, let ¹ ¿t
n be the conditional distribution
over ¹ Sn nS±
n, viewed as a strategy in ¹ G by letting the probability of strategies in S±
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For each n and ¹ sn 2 ¹ Sn, j¹ ¾t
n;¹ sn ¡ ¹ ¿t
n;¹ snj = O("
kp+1




t ) for all s±
n 2 S±
n.
Therefore, for each player n, if a pure strategy ¹ sn is at least as good a reply as another
¹ s0
n against the sequence ¹ ¾t, then it either continues to be so against ¹ ¿t




¡n; ¹ sn) = O("
kp+1
t ).
Let ^ ¾t be the sequence in § that is the image of the sequence ¹ ¿t
n under the map ¼ that
was de¯ned in x4.2. The support of each element of the sequence is ^ Sn and therefore it can
viewed as a sequence in ^ §n@^ §. In particular, the sequence is eventually in Un@^ §. Replace
^ ¾t with a subsequence that is contained in U and such that there exists n and sn;s0
n 2 ^ Sn




n;sn ¡ ^ "^ ¾t
n;s0
n) all along the subsequence. We
¯nish the proof of the theorem by showing the following two facts about the sequence ^ ¾t: (1)
"k
t = O(g(^ ¾t)); and (2) O("
kp+1
t ) = f(^ ¾t). Points (1) and (2) contradict our earlier conclusion
that f > cgp and, therefore, indeed ¯nishes the proof of the theorem.
Point (1) is true because "k
t = O(¹ ¾n;¾n(sn;s0
n;±)) and j¹ ¿n;¾n(sn;s0




We turn now to point (2). Since f(^ ¾t) = (Gn(^ ¾t
¡n;sn) ¡ Gn(^ ¾t
¡n;s0
n))(^ ¾t












We argue by contradiction. Suppose Gn(^ ¾t




t ). Then 0 <
Gn(¹ ¿t




t ). By what we saw earlier, this implies that sn is a
better reply than s0
n against the sequence ¹ ¾t. By "t!-properness of the sequence ^ ¾t, therefore:
(i) ^ ¾t
n;s0
n = O("t^ ¾t
n;sn); (ii) ^ ¾n;¾n(s
00
n;s0
n±) = O("t^ ¾n;¾n(s
00
n;sn;±)) for each s
00







n). These three properties continue to hold for the sequence ¹ ¿t




n = O("t^ ¾t
n;sn). But that would imply that su±ciently far out in the





n ¡ ^ "^ ¾t
n;sn)+ = 0, which is impossible since
^ ¾t is a sequence of completely mixed strategies in U and f is positive on the whole sequence.
This establishes the contradiction and proves point (2). ¤
8. Van Damme's Interpretation of Forward Induction
The theorems in x3, x6, and x7 do not address the stronger version of forward induction
considered by van Damme [8]. Van Damme interprets forward induction as a property of a
solution concept (such as stability) rather than a set of equilibria:6
\Kohlberg and Mertens argue that a solution of a game should ... be inde-
pendent of irrelevant alternatives, ... [this] requirement states that strategies
which certainly will not be used by rational players can have no in°uence
6An explicit formulation in these terms is attributed to van Damme by Fudenberg and Tirole [9, De¯nition
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on whether a solution is self-enforcing; it is the formalisation of the forward
induction requirement ... ." [8, x41.4 ]
That is, a solution concept maps each game into selected subsets of its equilibria, and van
Damme sees forward induction as requiring a certain consistency across games, akin to the
way independence of irrelevant alternatives is a property of an individual or social choice
function. Taking this approach, and supposing that a solution concept satis¯es invariance,
one can establish analogous results for the following strengthening of forward induction:
A subset §¤ of equilibria satis¯es strong forward induction if, for every game
~ G equivalent to the game obtained by deleting each player's pure strategies
that are inferior replies to every equilibrium in §¤, it includes an equilibrium
equivalent to a proper equilibrium of ~ G.
That is, just as the hypothesis of Theorem 6.1 assumes that §¤ includes an equilibrium
equivalent to a proper equilibrium of every game equivalent to the given game, so too the
conclusion of the analogous theorem asks for a proper equilibrium of every game equivalent
to the pruned game. This analogous theorem has a similar proof that was included in a
previous version of this paper. It is omitted here to avoid tying backward induction to
invariance or tying forward induction to a particular solution concept the way Kohlberg and
Mertens [18, Proposition 6] tied it to stability.
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